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STANDING REQUIREMENTS FOR OBTAINING REVIEW
OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION IN WASHINGTON
CORNELIUS J. PECK*
A discussion of the requirements for obtaining review of govern-
mental action might quickly degenerate into a sterile exercise in clas-
sification and distinction of the various situations in which challenges
to governmental action were permitted or denied. The situations in
which a person's interests, privileges, or rights have been sufficiently
involved to confer upon him the standing to obtain review are many
and varied. Certainly the Washington cases, which draw distinctions,
later to be repudiated or ignored, between state action and municipal
action and between expenditure of funds and control of property, as
well as the various pertinent statutory provisions, offer tempting ma-
terials for one inclined to catalog a field of law. The subject is, how-
ever, one which benefits greatly when viewed in the broader perspec-
tive of the role of the judiciary in the process of government. The
traditional legal language is that of standing and ripeness for review.
So viewed, the question becomes one of political science as much as
of law, and the evaluation of the soundness of decisions depends upon
whether the judiciary has properly discharged its function in the op-
eration of governmental machinery.
To take this view of standing requirements is not to belittle a com-
plementary purpose for their existence: That of assuring that decisions
are made on the basis of a complete and thorough development of the
issues which should be resolved in the making of a decision. Consid-
eration of the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis in controlling
subsequent decisions makes obvious the need to protect the public
from the possibility that judicially developed law be the product of
friendly suits in which both parties seek to establish the same prin-
ciple, perhaps to the detriment of many other persons whose conduct
or cases will be controlled by that precedent. But so viewed, standing
requirements do little more than aid the operation of judicial process
by ensuring that the interests of adverse parties will spur them on to
full development of the case. If this is the dominant purpose for in-
sisting upon standing requirements, greater leniency might be expected
*Professor of Law, University of Washington. The author is indebted to Richard J.
Howard, Esq., for his assistance in research on the Declaratory Judgment Act and the
decisions made under that statute.
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where the record disclosed what appeared to be a well developed pres-
entation of the issues, judged by judicial standards.
The more fundamental objection to lax standards for standing stems
from consideration of the role of the judiciary in the process of gov-
ernment and the necessity of preserving the proper balance between
the three traditional branches of government. In this respect, the ob-
jections to lax standards for standing are similar to the objections to
advisory opinions.1 Liberal allowance of suits exposes the judiciary
to the temptation, or a simply uncalculated assumption, of a super-
visory control of the activities of the legislative and executive branches
of government.
Judicial review of legislative action has in its supervisory control a
substantial anti-democratic aspect.2 This is not to say that it is im-
proper or should be condemned and avoided. It is merely a way of
stating the obvious fact that nine men, appointed either for life or
elected for reasons other than their abilities at representation, dis-
charge functions which permit them to frustrate majority will or even
to impose upon the majority the detested views of a minority. In other
words, in the guise of determining constitutionality the judiciary sets
out limitations upon the principle of majority rule and applies re-
straints upon majority action. While this may be the proper role of
the judiciary, the possibility of error alone-and the occasional pres-
ence of error is commemorated by overruled decisions-suggests that
caution be exercised in permitting occasions in which such anti-demo-
cratic action might occur.
A distinction might be drawn for these purposes between judicial
review involving the constitutionality of a statute and judicial review
which involves only the construction of a statute.' Thus, a case in-
volving only construction of a statute might be considered to involve
no threat of usurpation of the legislative function or frustration of
majority will. However, slight consideration of the extent to which
policy judgment affects problems of statutory construction should lead
1 Cf. Stevens, Advisory Opinions-Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L.
Rxv. 1 (1959).
2 M. R. Cohen, Is Judicial Review Necessary? in BASIC ISSUES oF AMERICAN DE-
mocAcy 202 (Bishop & Hendel ed. 1951); Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in
SUaRME COURT AND SUPREME LAw 172 (Cahn ed. 1954). But cf. Rostow, The Demo-
cratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HA v. L. REv. 193 (1952).
3 Some suggestions of such a distinction may be found in the emphasis given to the
presence of a constitutional question in DeGrief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 1, 13, 297
P.2d 940, 947 (1956) ; and Acme Fin. Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 107, 73 P.2d 341, 345
(1937). But contrary to the suggestion here made, the cases suggest that one may
obtain the aid of the judiciary when a constitutional question is raised, but not when
only a question of -statutory construction is presented.
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to the conclusion that even in this area the danger lurks that the
judiciary may substitute its policy views for those of the legislature
or legislate on matters upon which the legislature has not passed.'
Judicial review of executive or administrative action does not in-
volve a possible curbing of majority rule, except to the extent that the
validity or construction of a statute is called into issue. However, an-
other danger arises-that of assumption by the judiciary of a super-
visory control of affairs in which it has no special competence, replac-
ing the informed and expert judgments of officers and administrators
who were elected or appointed because of confidence in their abilities
to deal with the specialized problems falling within their jurisdictions.
Judges who would quickly recognize the artificial quality of Caesar's
statement that all Gaul is divided in three parts are frequently inclined
to believe that all the phenomena of the world are in their essence
divisible into the two categories of law and fact. Policy determina-
tions for future governmental programs may thus be subjected to the
artificial and even arbitrary categorization of the law-fact distinction.'
Moreover, the evidence upon which the policy determinations are
judged frequently must be accumulated under the restrictions of court-
room rules of evidence, supplemented by information which is subject
to judicial notice. No sensible person would so limit the information
upon which he based or judged the soundness of plans for business or
personal affairs. The dangers of imposing similar limitations upon the
planning functions and policy determinations of government again sug-
gest the wisdom of restricting the occasions upon which exposure to
that risk is justified by the possibility of harm to the party invoking
the aid of the judiciary.
A contrary view does claim that the possibility of error is no reason
for a court's refusal to prevent action by public officials which is illegal
and harmful to the public interest, even though the person invoking
the aid of the court shows no special or personal injury. Courts, so
the view goes, are the final arbiters of what is legal and what is illegal,
and the possibility that they may err provides no basis for precluding
them from the exercise of their supreme function.6 If public officers
4 See, e.g. HAND, How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision? in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, 103-110 (Dillard ed. 1952) ; Hurst, Review and the Distribution of
National Powers, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 140, 142 (Cahn ed. 1954) ;
Frank, , ords and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLU,. L.
REV. 1259 (1947) ; Frankfurter, Some Reflections Upon the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUm. L. REV. 527 (1947).
5 See Peck, The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Wf'ashington,
33 WASH. L. REV. 55, at 69-77 (1958).
6 See Jones v. Reed, 3 Wvrash. 57, 67-71, 27 Pac. 1067, 1070-71 (1891) (Hoyt, J.,
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are engaged in illegal activities and corrupt or lethargic Attorneys Gen-
eral or prosecutors fail to take action, citizens and taxpayers should
not have to sit helplessly by, unable to invoke the aid of courts. Some-
one must bring the culprits to the bar of justice and see that things
are lawfully done.
This view assumes, however, that law is some definite and certain
body of pre-existing rules which provides just and accurate measure-
ments of what constitutes proper action rather than a set of policy
decisions made by judges to dispose of the cases brought before them.
Of course, law is developed by judges in the decisional process, and is
not found by them. They do not have the occult powers, denied other
men, of seeing and consulting with what Holmes derisively called a
brooding omnipresence in the sky. Instead, giving consideration to
the general propositions stated in a constitution, deferring to what
other judges have said about the reach and extent of those proposi-
tions, and affected by value judgments formed by a multitude of fac-
tors, judges decide whether governmental action falls within permis-
sible limits. Inevitably the determinaton of what is permissible or
proper involves some policy judgment.'
Again, to recognize that courts make policy decisions is not to say
that they should not do so. It serves only as a caution that policy
decisions be made by them upon occasions in which they constitute
the body most competent to decide such questions or in which con-
sideration of factors other than those relating to the policy decision
leads the court to review decisions made by those more competent in
such matters.
Our society is one whose ways of living and doing business evolve
rapidly under pressure of technological change. The increase in popu-
lation alone presents new problems for government administrators. It
is in such an area, where problems are new and experience is limited,
that law in the traditional sense is least certain, and hence something
to which judges are not in a position to refer. It is an area in which
experimentation is necessary and in which new solutions to new prob-
lems are least likely to be disclosed by reliance upon precedent. The
previously noted limitations on judicial means for gathering informa-
tion makes it difficult to formulate new solutions. Absent a compel-
ling call for intervention, courts may, with profit to the community,
dissenting) ; Reiter v. Wallgren, 28 Wn.2d 872, 874-75, 184 P.2d 571, 572 (1947). Cf.
3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATLvE LAW § 22.09, at 248 (1958).
7 For a basic work developing a realistic appraisal of judicial process, see FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (6th printing, 1949).
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leave the development of those solutions to those persons whose daily
contact with the problems will give them a familiarity, expertness, and
breadth of experience which courts are unlikely to develop on a judi-
cially compiled record.'
In addition to doubts concerning the comparative qualifications of
courts, legislators, and administrators, other reasons exist for circum-
spection in defining the role of the judiciary in policy formulation.
Aggressive judicial intervention tends to inhibit government program-
ming pending judicial approval. Obtaining judicial review involves
expense and delay, and, absent actual government involvement in the
program, commits the judiciary to hazarding a guess about a program
which has not become real, definite and certain through actual opera-
tion. Some doubts may exist as to the extent to which judicial review
inhibits leadership and drive in the executive and legislative branches.
But it seems obvious that a public official, dependent upon the respect
and confidence of the electorate, will be deterred to a greater extent
in taking action if the freedom with which judicial review is accorded
substantially increases the occasions upon which his actions might be
branded illegal. Practical considerations likewise dictate the wisdom
of obtaining judicial approval of a program prior to its inception if it
is subject to upset even though no person has suffered any particular
injuries.
An atmosphere is created in which officials believe nothing positive
can be accomplished or undertaken until judicial approval has been
granted the plans. Thus we see the mayor of a large city refusing to
sign an ordinance essential to institution of a sewage disposal and
treatment system for the entire metropolitan area, not because of his
disapproval of the ordinance or the contract it authorized, but to ob-
tain a decision of the court declaring it valid.9 The same city faced
difficulties in paying architects working on the remodeling of a city
building because of the pendancy of a taxpayer's suit.10 The State
8 Thus, to a considerable extent the delay in passing judgment on the merits of the
World War II Renegotiation Acts, see Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326
U.S. 371 (1945) ; Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946) ; Aircraft
& Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947), permitted administrative experi-
mentation and accumulation of experience upon which a constitutionally sound program
could be developed for dealing with an unprecedented problem. Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742 (1948).
9 The Seattle Times, June 7, 1960, p. 40, col. 1. In another newspaper, an editorial
condemning the same mayor for lack of dynamic leadership qualities appeared beside an
article giving details of a much publicized taxpayer's suit against city officials with ap-
parently no consideration that a relationship might exist between the two subjects. The
Argus, December 11, 1959, p. 1.
10 The Seattle Times, April 23, 1959, p. 37, col. 3.
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Toll Bridge Authority awaited judicial approval of financing plans for
bridge construction in an arranged test suit in which plaintiff and re-
spondent are-both represented by the Attorney General,11 even though
previous delays were reported to have raised the cost of the bridge by
$10,000,000.12
Another consequence of liberality in granting judicial review is the
abdication by the legislature and the executive for determining the
propriety and constitutionality of their actions. Ideally, officials in
every branch of government should be concerned with the constitu-
tionality of proposed action as well as with whether the constitutional
minimum is the best that can be afforded for the circumstances. But
if one with no particular interest in the case may subject the execu-
tive or legslative view to a court test, the non-judicial officer may be
much inclined to view such decisions as the responsibility of the courts
and not his1 3 This abdication of responsibility tends to confuse what
is constitutional with what is meritorious or proper.1" The tone of gov-
ernment is thus set at the minimum level, rather than a possibly higher
standard.
In short, the respect to be given the principle of majority rule, the
deference which should be accorded the views of those placed in policy
formulating positions by the electorate, and the limitations of the judi-
cial process for the formulation of government policy dictate caution
in selection of situations in which review is given to action taken by
those in other branches of government. Otherwise the courtroom be-
comes a voting booth in which one disappointed in political matters
may cast an oversized ballot requiring conformance with his views on
matters which are much better debated and resolved in other forums.
On the other hand, when a person appears in court complaining that
he has suffered injuries special and different from others in the com-
munity and that the majority or their elected representatives are vio-
lating his personal rights, privileges, or immunities, the occasion justi-
fies judicial intervention to prevent what probably could not be avoided
by resort to other forums. When a public officer, whose official duties
charge him with the responsibility for conducting such litigation, in-
vokes the aid of the court, a proper occasion for the exercise of judi-
cial power may arise from the necessity of solving a dispute between
11 State ex rel. Wash. T. B. A. v. Yelle, 156 Wash. Dec. 82, 351 P.2d 493 (1960).
.2 Cuningham, Court's Action Will End Lake Bridge Row-Or Start It Anew,
The Seattle Times, January 3, 1960, p. 8, col. 6.
13 Cf. Jaffee, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 HARv. L. REv. 401, 402 (1958).
14 Cf. Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, in SUPREME Cotmv AND SUPRME LAw,
109, 120-21 (Cahn ed. 1954).
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what may be separate and independent departments headed by elected
officers in the executive branch of state government. Likewise, a legis-
lative request for judicial participation, made by statutory provisions
conferring standing upon persons who would otherwise lack the same,
obviates some of the concern for preserving stricter standing require-
ments.
Concern with the requisites for invoking judicial process is not, of
course, limited to the matter of standing to obtain review of govern-
mental action. It finds statement in the requirements for a case or
controversy within the meaning of article III of the federal constitu-
tion or the existence of a justiciable controversy for the exercise of
judicial power within the meaning of article IV, section 1 of the Wash-
ington constitution." It underlies the repeated refusal of the Wash-
ington court, like other courts, to render advisory opinions."6
Respect for the integrity of the legislative process and recognition
of the insuperable supervisory problems which would otherwise arise
has led the Washington court to leave to the legislature itself the re-
sponsibility for ensuring compliance with constitutional provisions re-
specting legislative process. This wise limitation upon judicial power
is expressed in the rule that the courts will refuse to look behind the
enrolled bill to determine the method, procedure, or manner in which
a bill was passed." The danger that anti-democratic action of the
judiciary will result in upsetting legislation embodying majority views
is mitigated by the rule that a party may not raise a question con-
cerning the constitutionality of a portion of a statute unless he is af-
fected by it.' This is so even though a criminal charge, while not
exactly qualifying a party as a civic-minded person, certainly provides
1" See Acme Fin. Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341 (1937).
16 DeGrief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 1, 14, 297 P.2d 940, 948 (1956) ; Kitsap
County v. City of Bremerton, 46 Wn.2d 362, 370, 281 P.2d 841, 846 (1955) ; Conaway
v. Time Oil Co., 34 Wn.2d 884, 895, 210 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1949) ; Brehm v. Retail Food
& Drug Clerks Union, 4 Wn.2d 98, 100-101, 102 P.2d 685, 686 (1940) ; State ex rel.
Pacific Am. Fisheries v. Darwin, 81 Wash. 1, 142 Pac. 441 (1914). See Stevens, supra
note 1. But cf. State ex rel. Lyon v. Commissioners, 31 Wn.2d 366, 373, 196 P.2d 997,
1001 (1948) ; State ex rel. Yakima Amusement Co. v. Yakima County, 192 Wash. 179,
73 P.2d 759 (1937).
17 Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 634, 47 P.2d 1016, 1020 (1935) ; State ex
rel. Dunbar v. State Board, 140 Wash. 433, 442, 249 Pac. 996, 999 (1926) ; State ex ret.
Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 464, 34 Pac. 201, 205 (1893).
18 State v. Canyon Lumber Corp., 46 Wn.2d 701, 284 P.2d 316 (1955); State v.
Grabinski, 33 Wn.2d 603, 612, 206 P.2d 1022, 1027 (1949) ; Griffiths v. State, 28 Wn.2d
493, 501, 183 P.2d 821, 825 (1947) ; Gengler v. King County, 12 Wn.2d 227, 235, 121
P.2d 346, 349 (1942) ; Ajax v. Gregory, 177 Wash. 465, 475-76, 32 P.2d 560, 564 (1934).
Such a question may be raised however if the unconstitutional provision is inseparable
from the other provisions of the statute and the court is of the opinion that the legisla-
ture would not have passed the act with the objectionable feature eliminated. In re
Hendrickson, 12 Wn.2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942).
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an incentive to discover whether the legislature has improperly suc-
cumbed to the pressures of an economic interest group in enacting a
licensing or regulatory scheme harmful to the public.19 Through these
rules respect is accorded the democratic principle of representative
government while the judiciary preserves its power to determine the
application of general principles to particular cases and to protect
minorities from the oppression of the majority.0
A willingness to permit "illegal action" or action which would other-
wise be condemned by the judiciary has been accepted as the neces-
sary price for obtaining better government through vigilant and dili-
gent action of prosecuting attorneys. The willingness is expressed in
the well established rule that prosecuting attorneys are not liable for
acts done in the course of their official duty even if the acts are com-
mitted with malice and without probable cause.2 A similar willing-
ness to tolerate errors and mistakes of judgment as the price of ob-
taining government personnel who will give good government is seen
in the immunity from personal liability granted other officers for acts
which involve the exercise of judgment and discretion.22 Even the gen-
eral doctrine of sovereign immunity from liability for injuries tortiously
inflicted upon citizens and taxpayers finds support today, not in the
doctrine that the King can do no wrong, but in the view that the
allowance of such suits would interfere with proper administration of
government, subverting the public interest through exposure to a mul-
titude of embarrassing suits.22 Indeed, in this judicially developed
doctrine denying a remedy to one suffering special and certain injuries,
one finds a stark conflict with a liberal allowance of standing to obtain
review of governmental action.
In other areas traditionally considered to be in the private law do-
main rules have been formulated through which the courts regularly
decline invitations to assume a supervisory control of public affairs.
Thus a general supervision of police and health department activities
is avoided by the rule that a private person may not maintain an action
to abate a public nuisance unless he has received special injury from
29 E.g. State v. Charrier, 151 Wash. 654, 276 Pac. 878 (1929) ; State ex rel. Hagen
v. Superior Court, 139 Wash. 454, 247 Pac. 942 (1926) ; State v. Wester, 135 Wash. 32,
236 Pac. 790 (1925) ; State v. Bowen & Co., 86 Wash. 23, 149 Pac. 330 (1915).
20 See C. L. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AWD THE CouRT 87 (1960).
21 Mitchelle v. Steele, 39 Wn.2d 473, 236 P.2d 349 (1951) ; Anderson v. Manley, 181
Wash. 327, 43 P.2d 39 (1935).
22 See Whatcom County v. Langlie, 40 Wn.2d 855, 246 P.2d 836 (1952). Cf. Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F2d 579 (2nd Cir., 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 949.
23 The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1869) ; Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329,
333, 123 Pac. 450, 453 (1912) ; 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAw § 25.01 (1958).
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it.2" The rule reflects a delicate balance. If the courts undertook super-
vision of the administration of health and safety laws at the request of
any civic-minded person the consequences might just as likely be dis-
ruption of an executive program of enforcement as the proverbial flood
of litigation. Budgeting problems require police and health agencies to
plan operations dealing with the more serious problems first. The un-
requested aid of a private party in instituting enforcement proceedings
may well divert agency personnel from other problems. Moreover, the
uninjured person who would pay the expenses necessary to maintain
such an action is more probably motivated to do so by consideration of
some private advantage rather than the public interest. On the other
hand, the requirement of special injury limits the occasions for judicial
action, constitutes an ensurance of proper motivation, and provides the
justification for intervention by the judiciary in pursuit of its traditional
function of protecting individual rights.
A similar reluctance to assume the role of the police or Federal Trade
Commision may be found in the refusal to allow even a competitor to
maintain an action to prevent false advertising unless he can show
special damage to himself.25 A willingness to permit some wrongs to go
unremedied in order to allow corporate management to guide the affairs
of business free from the harassment of suits by stockholders underlies
statutory developments restricting and limiting shareholder derivative
actions.26 In a newly developing area in labor relations strong voices
have argued that individual employees must sometimes be denied access
to courts or arbitrators in order that management and the bargaining
agent may work out appropriate solutions to problems which were not
actually foreseen or considered during the negotiation of the collective
bargaining agreement." Otherwise the courts or arbitrators, using prin-
ciples of contract law and looking for an intent which never existed,
will make policy decisions on matters which the parties to the agreement
never considered.
Throughout this discussion has run the theme that the proper occa-
sion for the exercise of judicial power is in the determination of how
general principles apply to specific situations and affect the rights, privi-
24 RCW 7.48.210. Elves v. King County, 49 Wn.2d 201, 299 P.2d 206 (1956) ; State
ex rel. Vandervort v. Grant, 156 Wash. 96, 286 Pac. 63 (1930) ; Griffith v. Holman, 23
Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900).
25 E.g. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
See Callman, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 COLUm. L. REV. 876 (1948).
26 See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUm. L. REV.
1 (1947). Cf. Davis v. Harrison, 25 Wn.2d 1, 167 P.2d 1015 (1946).
27 Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956). Hanslowe,
Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959).
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leges, duties, and immunities of particular persons. Abstract questions
and broad general propositions are eschewed as potential sources of
errors and difficulties and are encountered only insofar as necessary to
the disposition of an immediate and definite case. The fallibilities of the
judicial process as well as foreseeable and undesired side-effects upon
other institutions of society, whether other branches of government,
private corporations, or collective bargaining relationships, induce a
toleration of error or wrongdoing in those institutions as an alternative
preferable to the situation which would be produced by intensive judi-
cial supervision. Recognition of the policy-making aspects of the judi-
cial process leads to comparative evaluation of abilities at policy mak-
ing and to deference to the views of those whose abilities are supposed
to be superior for particular types of problems. With this general back-
ground we may turn to consideration and appraisal of the specifics of
Washington law.
THE STATE ADm NST ATE PROCEDuRE ACT
In 1959 the Model Administrative Procedure Act, modified to a
limited extent, was enacted in Washington.28 Of course, its provisions
are applicable only to state agencies, and not to counties or municipal
corporations. Section 7 of the act, RCW 34.04.070, provides for declar-
atory judgment proceedings to determine the validity of any rule
promulgated by an agency. Section 13 of the act, RCW 34.04.130, pro-
vides for judicial review of final decisions in contested cases heard by
agencies. The former provision, which has yet to receive a judicial in-
terpretation, specifically limits the declaratory judgment proceedings
to those where "[T]he rule, or its threatened application, interferes
with or impairs or immediately threatens to interfere with or impair,
the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner." [Emphasis added]. The
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, RCW 7.24.010, enacted in 1935
contains no similar limitation to present or immediately threatened im-
pairment of rights or privileges.2" Accordingly, it would appear that the
avenue to judicial review found in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act is at least as broad as that of the more recent statute and that stand-
28 RCW 34.04.010-.030 (1959). For a brief discussion of the act, see Trautman &
Peck, The Administrative Procedures Act, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 281 (1959).2 9 The Model State Administrative Procedure Act contains no requirement of an
immediate threat to interfere with or impair legal rights. In this respect, the Wash-
ington act thus establishes more stringent standing requirements. The Model Act's
provision has been criticized for permitting advisory opinions. Abel, The Double Stand-
ard in Administrative Procedure Legislation: Model Act and Federal Act, 33 IowA
L. Ray. 228, 245 (1948).
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ing requirements for these purposes have not been relaxed by enactment
of the State Administrative Procedures Act."
Section 13 of the act, providing for judicial review of final decisions
in contested cases, likewise has not yet received a judicial interpreta-
tion. It provides that "Any person aggrieved by a final decison . .. is
entitled to judicial review thereof only under this chapter." This lan-
guage, differing from the language of the Model Act in the presence
of the word "only" and the absence of a saving clause preserving other
methods of review, manifests a legislative purpose of substituting a
single uniform review provision for the many inconsistent and varied
review provisions which formerly existed. 1 To the same extent it might
be thought to establish a new and single standard for determining
whether a person has standing to obtain review of decisions in con-
tested cases.
However, the phrase "person aggrieved" has no definite and fixed
content. It does seem to encompass more than those who were parties
to the administrative proceeding. Thus sections 9 through 12 speak of
"parties to proceedings," giving emphasis to the use of "person
aggrieved" to define those entitled to review. One commentator finds
in the review section a legislative restatement of the rule that review
is available even in the absence of other express statutory provision
therefor.3" Another notes that the act can hardly be open to the criti-
cism of circumscribing the class of persons who may get to court over
administrative determinations in contested cases. 3 Professor Davis
finds no special significance in the particular language used in the Model
Act." It seems then that the determination of who is a "person ag-
grieved" must as in the past rest upon a complex of factors, factual,
statutory, and constitutional.
Standing: A JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION
The standing of the plaintiff to maintain the action goes, of course,
to the question of whether there is a case or controversy which presents
30 Some doubt exists as to whether the Administrative Procedures Act has rendered
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act inoperable with respect to tests of administra-
tive rules. The author's view is that it does not. See Trautman & Peck, supra note 28,
at 288, n.36 (1959). Cf. Inland Empire Rural Electrification, Inc., v. Department of
Pub. Serv., 199 Wash. 527, 92 P.2d 258 (1939). But cf. Mulhausen v. Bates, 9 Wn.2d
264, 114 P.2d 995 (1941).
31 See Trautman & Peck, supra note 28, at 289.
32 Schwartz, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 WASH. L. REv. 1
(1958).
33 Lehan Tunks, The Model Act Route to Improvement of Iowa Administrative Pro-
cedure, 33 IOWA L. REV. 356, 367 (1948).
34 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.03, at 216 (1958).
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a proper occasion for the exercise of judicial power. As such, it raises
a question of the jurisdiction of the court and like other jurisdictional
questions, it may be raised at any time during the proceeding or by the
court on its own motion. 5 The Washington cases are in accord." But,
as will appear, both the parties to the proceedings and the Washington
courts have frequently negected to raise what would appear to be sub-
stantial questions of standing.
STATE TAXPAYER SUITS
One matter should be made clear at the outset of any discussion of
the standing conferred upon a person to obtain review of governmental
action in his capacity as a taxpayer: In these days of fiscal crisis major
reliance for the raising of revenue has been placed upon excise taxes,
primarily the sales tax, and for practical purposes the property tax has
been abandoned as a source of state government support.3 The conse-
quence is that to say "taxpayer" is little different from saying "every-
body." Even a four year old child may become a taxpayer by purchas-
ing three candy bars and, indeed, not long ago a thirteen year old boy
obtained an Attorney General's opinion on his obligations to pay such
a tax on his purchases of confections.3 " Stripped of its honorific, if not
onerous, connotations, designation of a party as a taxpayer does little
to distinguish his claim to judicial asistance from that of any other
person within the state.
Professor Davis, who disapproves of the federal rule denying stand-
ing to taxpayers, gives hearty approval to the majority rule recognizing
taxpayer standing at the state and municipal level.3" He suggests that
the federal rule, which found its authoritative statement in Frothing-
ham v Mellon,4" frequently referred to as Masachusetts v. Mellon, be
discarded in recognition that the high level of corporation taxes gives
such taxpayers a recognizable stake in federal expenditures.' Presum-
ably, however, he would not limit taxpayer standing to corporations or
to individuals whose tax obligations are in the higher brackets, and
35 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATVE LAW § 22.01, at 209-10 (1958).
30 Kitsap County v. City of Bremerton, 46 Wn.2d 362, 366, 281 P.2d 841, 844 (1955);
Adams v. City of Walla Walla, 196 Wash. 268, 271, 82 P.2d 584, 586 (1938) ; Wash-
ington Beauty College Inc. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 166, 80 P.2d 403, 405 (1938) ; Cf.
State v. Fruitland Irrigation Dist., 196 Wash. 11, 81 P.2d 844 (1938).
37 Harsch & Shipman, The Constitutional Aspects of Washington's Fiscal Crisis,
33 WAsH. L. REv. 225, 230 (1958).
38 The Seattle Times, June 5, 1958, p. 1, col. 1; The Seattle Times, May 29, 1958,
p. 11, col. 3.
39 3 DAVIS, ADmIiSTRAIVE LAW § 22.09, 243-48 (1958).
40 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
41 Davis, op. cit. supra note 40, at 244, 248, 293.
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accordingly his argument carries him to support of standing for tax-
payers without identifiable interests. More important, even with the
largest taxpayers, his argument that they have an identifiable interest
in large federal expenditures is premised upon the absence of govern--
ment economy in rejection of desirable programs which would have
been undertaken except for lack of revenue. If government does so
economize in the selection of programs, the upsetting of one program
would only serve to make feasible the undertaking of another, with
no consequent reduction in taxes. Consideration of the perennial fiscal
difficulties both at state and federal level, and a survey of our unsatis-
fied public needs should lead to the conclusion that such economy is
practiced in government. At least, the possibility of benefit to a tax-
payer through reduction of taxes upon a successful challenge of a
government program is so highly speculative that it seems inaccurate
to designate his interest in such litigation as personal.
Taxpayer standing is usually enhanced by an association with citizen-
ship, and thus it is frequently reported that the action is one brought by
a citizen and taxpayer. Entirely aside from the question of whether
recognition of standing in citizen taxpayers and denial of standing to
non-citizen taxpayers is a denial of equal protection of law, it is appar-
ent that citizen designation does little to distinguish a party's claim
from that of any other member of the public. Moreover, reliance upon
citizenship to establish standing suggests the propriety of relying upon
the voting franchise rather than litigation as the means of vindicating
those interests.
In the early case of Jones v. Reed42 the Washington court gave con-
sideration, untrammeled as the opinion said by precedent or authority,
to laying down a policy for the state with respect to citizen taxpayer
suits in which no private interests were involved. The recognized stand-
ing of taxpayers to challenge municipal action was not considered perti-
nent, being based upon the analogy governing suits by stockholders in
private corporations and inconsistent with the sovereignty of the state.
Judge Dunbar, speaking for the majority, said:
[W] e may presume that if one of the departments of the state gov-
ernment can be suspended at the instance of a private citizen, who has
nothing more than a community interest in a matter which concerns
the general public, that every department of the state can be suspended
at the same time, and the whole machinery of the government stopped
and the very existence of the state, so far as the exercise of its func-
423 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067 (1891).
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tions are concerned, destroyed. Surely such a theory of practice is not
in harmony with the genius of our government, nor wil authority sanc-
tion, or public policy permit, the adoption of a rule which will author-
ize any number of volunteers who may, rightfully or wrongfully, in-
terpret the law different from the interpretation put upon them by the
officers of the state, to paralyze for a time every or any branch of the
state government.... To prevent just such results, and to protect the
interests of the public, the statute has provided for the election by the
taxpayers of an officer-the attorney general-who is especially clothed
with authority to institute proceedings of this ldnd."3
Judge Hoyt dissented, arguing that citizens and taxpayers should not
have to sit by while public officials engaged in illegal acts and wasted
public funds. The possibility of error or abuse in citizen taxpayer suits
was, he believed, no greater than in actions brought by a prosecuting
attorney or the Attorney General
In Jones v. Reed the citizen taxpayer had sought to enjoin what he
conceived to be a misapplication of funds appropriated for an agricul-
tural college. In the fifty years that followed, the principle of Jones v.
Reed was applied to deny standing to a grain broker who paid fees for
inspections and licenses into a special fund from which he believed dis-
bursements were being made in violation of the state constitution;" to
a municipality and its citizen taxpayers who sought to enjoin a state
officer, allegedly acting in excess of his powers, from executing a lease
of land upon which the lessee would create a nuisance; 5 to a citizen
taxpayer seeking to set aside a sale of school lands allegedly consum-
ated through fraud and collusion; 6 to citizen taxpayers seeking to en-
join an allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of state funds in the
construction of the Lake Washington canal; 7 to a citizen taxpayer
who sought to enjoin the state auditor and county commissioners from
certifying or issuing warrants for payment of a paving contract awarded
through fraud;"8 to a citizen taxpayer who sought to compel Bible study
in the public schools; 9 to citizen property owners and taxpayers who
sought to restrain the use of highway funds for construction of a bridge
in lieu of paving streets;5" and to a former property owner who as a
43Id. at 65, 27 Pac. at 1069.
"Birmingham v. Cheetham, 19 Wash. 657, 54 Pac. 37 (1898).
45City of Tacoma v. Bridges, 25 Wash. 221, 65 Pac. 186 (1901).
40Powers v. Webster, 47 Wash. 99, 91 Pac. 569 (1907).
47 Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 Pac. 19 (1911). See also Bilger v. State, 60
Wash. 454, 111 Pac. 771 (1910) (issuing a supersedeas against an injunction which
prohibited further work on the canal).48 State ex rel. Pierce County v. Superior Court, 86 Wash. 685, 151 Pac. 108 (1915).
49 State ex rel. Clithero v. Showalter, 159 Wash. 519, 293 Pac. 1000 (1930).
50 State exv rel. Jueneman v. Superior Court, 157 Wash. 429, 289 Pac. 28 (1930).
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citizen and taxpayer sought to have set aside a sale of property made
by a county after it had foreclosed for delinquent taxes.5 ' In three other
cases the policy of submitting litigation concerning the disposition of
public funds to the guidance and control of the Attorney General was
recognized and confirmed,52 though one of them made clear that his con-
trol was not exclusive since the Governor, as the supreme executive
power, might also maintain an action to enjoin illegal payments of pub-
lic funds.5"
In 1946 another citizen taxpayer assault on the rule was attempted
in an action to enjoin the State Capitol Committee from consumating
a sale of capitol building lands allegedly illegal because the price which
the state would receive was far in excess of the price fixed by the ap-
praisals of lumber cruisers. When the case, Reiter v. Wallgren,4
reached the supreme court after dismissal by the trial court, the appel-
lant taxpayer attempted to distinguish Jones v. Reed by limiting it to
cases involving the disposition of state revenue as contrasted with suits
involving the disposition of property, arguing that purposes of confiding
the conduct of litigation to the care of the Attorney General would be
served in an action in which the Governor was a defendant and repre-
sented by the Attorney General.5 The argument produced a Pyrrhic
victory for the citizen taxpayer. Impressed with the arguments both
for and against taxpayer suits, the departmental opinion attempted to
set a course between the extremes of complete allowance and complete
denial, characterizing them as the Scylla and Charybdis of judicial re-
view of actions of governmental officers. Reserving the question of
whether only the Attorney General could maintain an action to pre-
vent public funds from being improperly used, the court directed its
attention to the charge that property was being sold illegally and stated:
"We have never held that, in a proper case where the attorney general
refused to act to protect the public interest, a taxpayer could not do so.
We have not had occasion to pass upon such a question, and we trust
we never shall." 7 Then, noting that the taxpayer involved failed to
allege that he had made demands upon the Attorney General to prevent
consumation of the transaction or to set it aside or to allege the exist-
51 Sasse v. King County, 196 Wash. 242, 82 P.2d 536 (1938).
52 State v. Gattavara, 182 Wash. 325, 47 P.2d 18 (1935) ; State ex rel. Hartley v.
Clausen, 146 Wash. 588, 264 Pac. 403 (1928) ; State ex reL. Dunbar v. State Board, 140
Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996 (1926).
53 State ex rel. Hartley v. Clausen, supra note 52.
54 28 Wn.2d 872, 184 P.2d 571 (1947).
55 Brief for Appellant, pp. 27-63.
56 28 Wn.2d 872, 882, 184 P.2d 571, 576 (1947).
57 Id. at 876, 184 P.2d at 573.
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ence of a situation making such a demand hopeless, the court concluded
that legal capacity to sue had not been established."
The decision was overlooked in a subsequent 1953 decision denying
standing to a private person who failed in his effort to have renewals of
leases of oyster lands set aside upon the ground that they had been
procured through fraud of the lessee. 9 But in the case of State ex rel
Lemon v. Langlie60 the court rejected the argument that the indication
in Reiter v. Wallgren of the conditions of taxpayer standing was dic-
tum, and based its allowance of standing upon that decision. That case,
State ex rel Lemon v. Langlie, was an action brought by four citizens
and taxpayers and a corporate taxpayer to compel the governor and the
heads of thirteen state agencies in the executive department to move
the offices of those agencies from Seattle to Olympia. Both the Governor
and the Attorney General had declined to act upon the request to cause
the removal. Dividing five to four on the merits, the majority held that
removal of the offices was required by various constitutional provisions
relating to the seat of government.
A 1958 decision in State ex rel Tattersall v Yelle"' greatly confuses
the situation. In an action brought to prevent the payment of Washing-
ton's share of the operating costs of the Western Interstate Commission
for Higher Education, the majority distinguished the line of cases fol-
lowing Jones v. Reed, not on the ground formulated in Reiter v. Wall-
gren, but upon the basis that subsequent to those decisions the-Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act had been enacted. Then, proceeding to es-
tablish the proposition that the Declaratory Judgment Act confers
authority upon a state taxpayer to test the constitutionality of a statute,
the majority cited and quoted from State ex rel Lemon v. Langlie, a
mandamus proceeding, and Reiter v. Wallgren, an equitable action for
an injunction. The reservation in Reiter v. Wallgren of the question of
whether only the Attorney General may maintain an action to prevent
improper use of public funds went unmentioned, although it was perti-
nent to the case and has been called to the Court's attention by the
Attorney General's brief." To climax the situation, Miller v. City of
Pasco," a suit involving a municipality, was cited and relied upon by
the majority without any recognition of the distinction restated in that
opinion which for so long had been drawn between suits to obtain re-
58 Id. at 881-82, 184 P.2d at 576.
59 Herrold v. Case, 42 Wn.2d 912, 259 P.2d 830 (1953).
60 45 Wn.2d 82, 273 P.2d 464 (1954).
61 52 Wn.2d 856, 329 P.2d 841 (1958).
62 Brief for Respondent, pp. 9-10.
6s 50 Wn.2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957).
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view of state action and suits to obtain review of municipal action.
Judge Mallery, with the concurrence of three of his colleagues, dis-
sented, arguing that political opposition to a law does not constitute
a justiciable issue and that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain
the action.
It thus appears that a substantial if not complete reversal of the rule
established in the 1891 decision in Jones v. Reed has been accom-
plished. Professor Davis views the decision in Reiter v. Wallgren as a
modification of the former Washington rule denying standing. 4 The
opinion certainly suggests a partial reversal in the extent to which the
dissenting opinion of the earlier case, which had been unpersuasive to
the majority of the court, is embraced to provide a rationale for the
later decision. The distinction between suits to prevent improper use
of public funds and suits to prevent improper disposition of property,
having no functional relevance, served its purpose of distinguishing
otherwise controlling cases and now appears to have been abandoned.
The more important distinction made in Reiter v. Wallgren was that
earlier cases had not involved situations in which an unsuccessful de-
mand for action had been made upon the Attorney General. However,
the court erred in making the distinction by overlooking the very clear
statement in the earlier decision in Powers v. Webster,6" that demand
had been made upon the Attorney General to bring action to set aside
the allegedly fraudulent sale and that he had refused to do so. More-
over, the requirement of such a demand and refusal establishes only a
chimerical protection against the abuses of taxpayer suits. No matter
how tenuous or unfounded the claim, standing is established when the
Attorney General properly refuses to act. To give such effect to his
denial of the request also runs contrary to the presumption previously
stated that the Attorney General will properly discharge his obligations
and bring suits in those matters brought to his attention which merit
litigation, while rejecting those in which it is against the public interest
to do so.6"
What has been gained in the few years since the court, failing to
realize the extent of the former rule, established state taxpayer stand-
ing? As Judge Mallery pointed out in his dissent in the Tattersall case,67
for about two and one-half years the State of Washington was prevented
64 3 DAvis, ADMINisATIVE LAW § 22.09 at 246.
65 47 Wash. 99, 101, 91 Pac. 569 (1907).
60 State ex rel. Pierce County v. Superior Court, 86 Wash. 685, 692, 151 Pac. 108, 110
(1915). Cf. also the cases cited supra notes 21, 22.
67 52 Wn.2d 856, 865-66, 329 P.2d 841 (1958).
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from carrying out its part of an interstate compact to provide higher
educational facilities for training in the fields of dentistry, medicine,
public health, and veterinary medicine. And this was accomplished
at the whim of a taxpayer, with no personal interest in the matter,
whose view of the law was unanimously rejected by all the judges who
considered it on the merits.
In the other principal state taxpayer case decided since the change
in the rule, State ex rel Lemon v. Langlie, the plaintiffs did succeed on
the merits. But the justification for taxpayer suits in compelling adher-
ence to the law is undermined when consideration is given to the fact
that "the law" to which adherence was required was so uncertain that
removal of the offices was required by a five to four vote, so that a
change of view by one judge would have produced a contrary result.
Indeed, it seems fair to characterize that decision as one in which
residents at the state capital, whose personal rights were not involved,
motivated by the prospects of increasing income and profits of Olympia
businesses, succeeded in having a judiciary, which was not very certain
about the correct answer to the question, overrule the informed judg-
ment of the Legislature, the Governor, the Attorney General, and de-
partment executives, who were quite certain where various government
offices ought to be in the interests of the state and the people governed.
In exercising this king-sized ballot in the courtroom, they also suc-
ceeded in causing the state to undertake a tremendously expensive pro-
gram involving the construction of new office buildings and the moving
of equipment and personnel. The result of this tremendous expenditure
in the opinion of those most qualified to judge-the executive officers
who handle state business and who selected other locations-will be
perpetual inconvenience to the state and the people governed.
CITIZEN-TAXPAYER SUITS AGAINST MUmcIPA.
CORPORATIONS AND COUNTIES
As the preceding discussion indicates, Washington courts have al-
ways given recognition to citizen-taxpayer status as a sufficient basis
for obtaining judicial review of certain types of municipal action. Fre-
quently satisfaction of standing requirements appears to be assumed,
and the question is passed without discussion. As this section will in-
dicate, citizen-taxpayer status has not always been a sufficient basis
for obtaining judicial review, but the areas in which this is so are de-
fined frequently by dicta and with a vagueness that leaves much un-
certainty. To a large extent the same rules apply to actions involving
1960]
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counties and county officers, though a literal reading of the statutory
provision for appeal from action of the Board of County Commission-
ers would suggest even greater liberality. Strangely, this statutory pro-
vision was early given a limited reading,68 while the judicially devel-
oped bases for standing were recognized with relative liberality.
Recognition of standing in a municipal taxpayer to prevent illegal
disposition of municipal funds or property rests largely upon the an-
alogy of derivative shareholder suits to prevent dissipation of the assets
of private corporations.69 The analogy is, however, subject to several
defects."0 A municipal taxpayer need not be a person or a resident of
the municipality. Accordingly, its or his interest in avoiding expendi-
ture of funds is not necessarily consistent with good government un-
less the somewhat puerile view is taken that all public expenditures
are evil. Accordingly, a greater coincidence probably exists between
the economic interests of a private corporation and the economic in-
terests of a private shareholder, both concerned with maximizing prof-
its, than between the economic interests of a taxpayer and the broader,
generalized interests of the persons constituting a municipality.
As previously noted, challenges to governmental action by munici-
palities and counties are frequently permitted without consideration
or discussion of the standing of the party who commenced the pro-
ceeding. Thus a challenge to a proposal to acquire a street railway
system was considered on the merits without discussion of the tax-
payer's standing.7 Likewise considered on the merits without con-
sideration of standing were challenges to proposals to enter into a
variety of other contracts, 7 2 attempts to enjoin payments under con-
tracts which had been made at least partially performed,73 objections
68 RCW 36.32.330 provides, "Any person may appeal to the superior court from any
decision or order of the board of county commissioners...." It was early decided that,
despite the possibility of a contrary literal reading, only persons who were parties to
the proceeding could appeal under this section. Morath v. Gorham, 11 Wash. 577, 40
Pac. 129 (1895). It was later decided that the provision should be limited to matters
involving the exercise of purely judicial power. Selde v. Lincoln County, 25 Wash. 198,
65 Pac. 192 (1901) ; State ex rel. Yeargin v. Maschke, 90 Wash. 249, 155 Pac. 1064
(1916). The provision has also been held inapplicable where the board acts pursuant
to a special statute. Ocosta School Dist. v. Grays Harbor County, 44 Wn.2d 525, 268
P.2d 663 (1954).
69 See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) ; Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57,
27 Pac. 1067 (1891).
70 See Note, Taxpayers' Suits as a Means of Controlling the Expenditure of Public
Funds, 50 HARv. L. REv. 1276 (1937).
71 Twichell v. City of Seattle, 106 Wash. 32, 179 Pac. 127 (1919).
72 Shields v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 308, 140 Pac. 353 (1914) (contract for pur-
chase of fire fighting apparatus) ; Goshert v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 645, 107 Pac.
860 (1910) (contract for fire alarm system) ; Baum v. Sweeny, 5 Wash. 712, 32 Pac.
778 (1893) (contract for county printing).
73 Wade v. City of Tacoma, 131 Wash. 245, 230 Pac. 99 (1924) ; O'Neill v. Auburn,
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to the use of day laborers in lieu of civil service employees,74 estab-
lishment of a sanitation department to dispose of garbage, and con-
tentions that moneys in special funds were improperly being devoted
to purposes for which other funds should have been used." Suits to
enjoin the issuance of bonds have likewise been decided without dis-
cussion of the standing question,"7 as was a suit to enjoin execution of
a lease, 8 as well as suits to compel the granting of high school gradu-
ation credit to courses in Bible study, 9 to compel the furnishing of
transportation to a religiously sponsored school, 0 and to challenge the
operation of a program of released time for religious instruction.8
Indeed, a recent decision of utmost importance to the economy of the
state and the Seattle area was made, holding unconstitutional plans
for an industrial development district, without consideration of the
taxpayer's standing.
With respect to a number of these cases the existing precedents prob-
ably were considered controlling by counsel, who accordingly did not
raise the point. But this is by no means true of all the cases in this
area where refined and technical distinctions are drawn. Authority ex-
ists to establish the standing of a taxpayer to obtain review of pro-
posals to enter into contracts involving illegal expenditures which will
impose a burden on the taxpayers."3 Indeed, it was early made clear
that status as a taxpayer would confer standing though the more real
76 Wash. 207, 135 Pac. 1000 (1913) ; Booth v. Snohomish County, 75 Wash. 122, 134
Pac. 686 (1913) ; Woldenberg v. Sampson, 55 Wash. 152, 104 Pac. 184 (1909).
74 Butcheck v. Collier, 174 Wash. 311, 24 P.2d 619 (1933).
75 Smith v. City of Spokane, 55 Wash. 219, 104 Pac. 249 (1909).
70 Automobile Club v. City of Seattle, 49 Wn.2d 262, 300 P.2d 577 (1956) ; Asia v.
City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 674, 206 Pac. 366 (1922). But cf. Von Herberg v. City of
Seattle, 20 F.2d 247, (W. D. Wash. 1927).
77 Hughbanks v. Port of Seattle, 193 Wash. 498, 76 P.2d 603 (1938) ; Bier v. Clem-
ents, 98 Wash. 310, 167 Pac. 903 (1917) ; Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 127
Pac. 580 (1912) ; Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427, 33 Pac. 1059 (1893). Cf. Seymour
v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 138, 32 Pac. 1077 (1893) (refusing on the merits to enjoin the
election authorizing the bond issue).
78 Bremerton Municipal League v. Bremer, 15 Wn.2d 231, 130 P.2d 367 (1942).
70 State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 Pac. 35 (1918).
80 Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wn.2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949).
81 Perry v. School Dist. No. 81, Spokane County, 54 Wn.2d 886, 344 P.2d 1036
(1959) noted 35 WAsH. L. Rv. 143 (1960).82 Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wn.2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959), noted 35 WAsH.
L. REv. 204 (1960). Compare Heisey v. Port of Tacoma, discussed in text accompany-
ing note 93 infra denying taxpayer standing in a challenge to the validity of the 1939
Port Districts Act in a declaratory judgment proceeding.
83Saeex -el. Gebhardt v. Superior Court, 15 Wn.2d 673, 680, 131 P.2d 943, 947
(1942); Bellingham Am. Publishing Co. v. Bellingham Publishing Co., 145 Wash. 25,
28, 258 Pac. 836, 837 (1927) ; Times Publishing Co. v. City of Everett, 9 Wash. 518,
522, 37 Pac. 695, 696 (1894).
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and substantial interest of a competitor bidding on the contract moti-
vated his bringing of the suit.84 Likewise well established is the stand-
ing of a local taxpayer to enjoin payments for services performed
under contracts suffering from a legal defect, 5 or requiring an illegal
expenditure of funds.8 The cases proceed upon the assumption that
injury to the taxpayers is to be conclusively presumed from the unlaw-
ful expenditure of money, an appealing sounding presumption which
may play havoc with governmental services not expressly required by
statute, such as a tract index for recording of deeds and other instru-
ments of conveyance." Likewise subject to review in a taxpayer's ac-
tion were sales of asphalt from a municipally operated plant" and the
licensing of advertising space on parking meters.8 " Taxpayers have
also succeeded in obtaining tests of municipal power to execute leases
as well as with their compliance with provisions governing the execu-
tion of leases." Likewise subject to review to prevent fraud or gross
abuse of discretion are the actions of municipal corporations and school
districts in compromising claims against them."' The fact that the
taxes have been levied and the funds to be expended already collected
does not deprive the taxpayer of standing.9
An essential element in each of the foregoing cases in which stand-
ing was found appears to be the disbursement of funds from the public
treasury. Where it is lacking the court frequently denies standing.
Thus Heisey v. Port of Tacoma93 was a declaratory judgment proceed-
ing in which the plaintiff sought a declaration that the Port Districts
Act" was unconstitutional. Although the plaintiff alleged that Pierce
County planned to transfer certain lands to an industrial development
district, and that he was a citizen and taxpayer of Pierce County, he
failed to allege that he owned any land in the district or that there
would be any expenditure of public funds or the levy of any tax in
84 Times Publishing Co. v. City of Everett, supra note 83, at 523-24, 37 Pac. at
696-97.
85 Dirks v. Collin, 37 Wash. 620, 624, 79 Pac. 1112, 1113 (1905) ; Miller v. Sullivan,
32 Wash. 115, 118, 72 Pac. 1022, 1024 (1903).
86 Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist., 17 Wn2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943).
87 Dirks v. Collin, supra note 85. Cf. Barnett v. Lincoln, 162 Wash. 613, 624, 299
Pac. 392, 399 (1931).
88 Shanstrom v. Case, 103 Wash. 672, 175 Pac. 323 (1918).
8 9 Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 328 P.2d 873 (1958).
90 Miller v. City of Pasco, 50 Wn.2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957) ; Barnett v. Lincoln,
162 Wash. 613, 299 Pac. 392 (1931).
91 Warburton v. Tacoma School Dist., 155 Wash. Dec. 820, 350 P.2d 161 (1960);
Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wn.2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947) ; Jones v. City of Cen-
tralia, 157 Wash. 194, 206, 289 Pac. 3, 7 (1930).
92 State ex rel. Chealander v. Morgan, 131 Wash. 145, 148, 229 Pac. 309, 310 (1924).
93 4 Wn.2d 76, 102 P.2d 258 (1940).
94 Wash. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 45, p. 130.
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which he was directly interested. Accordingly, the court concluded
that he lacked standing. In a more recent proceeding in which the
taxpayer apparently wanted to challenge a decision on the location of
a county-city health building, the court denied standing in the absence
of allegations of general damage to taxpayers. 5 Similarly, a justice of
the peace who brought suit as a citizen and taxpayer to test the con-
titionality of a statute establishing municipal courts was held to be
without standing in the absence of allegations showing injury to him-
self or the public treasury. 6
A distinction of these from the previously discussed cases is possible
on the basis of lack of alleged injury to the public treasury. But the
validity of the distinction appears doubtful if judicial review is bene-
ficial in the context of municipal and county affairs unless the summa
bonam of government, entitled to protection beyond all other things,
is to refrain'from spending money. Certainly the presumed and ficti-
tious personal injury to an individual taxpayer, such as that resulting
from the expenditure of funds to maintain a tract index or the contin-
gent loss of rentals through inadequate security," does not provide a
rational basis for judicial intervention and supervision if it is undesira-
ble in other situations. If the basis for intervention is the superiority
of the judiciary in the interpretation of statutes to determine the legal-
ity of an expenditure, that same ability should lead to intervention in
other areas not involving expenditure of funds and to withdrawal from
some areas in which statutory construction does not occupy a para-
mount place in determination of the propriety of the expenditure.98
Another case questionable but not overruled is one in which the city
of Spokane appointed a corporation counsel and paid him a monthly
salary, out of which he was to furnish sufficient law assistants and sec-
retarial help to enable him to attend to the legal business of the city.9
A resident taxpayer contended that this violated provisions of the city
charter requiring the city council to fix the compensation of all officers,
assistants, and employees. Noting that the record showed a decrease
in the cost of maintaining the office, the court concluded the arrange-
ment was beneficial to taxpayers, and accordingly found no basis for
standing. The rationale would appear to be that the saving of money
95 In re City of Bellinghamn, 52 Wn.2d 497, 326 P.2d 741 (1958).96 DeGrief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 1, 297 P.2d 940 (1956). Apparently the
standing question was raised by the supreme court itself. At least it does not appear
in the briefs filed.
97 See cases cited note 87 supra.98 E.g. State ex rel. Chealander v. Morgan, 131 Wash. 145, 229 Pac. 309 (1924).99 Maxwell v. Smith, 87 Wash. 629, 152 Pac. 530 (1915).
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in any way and regardless of the effect upon the public service is de-
sirable. In any event, it is one situation in which, absent a showing of
personal injury, a taxpayer was unable to establish his standing to sue.
In Sasse v. King County.. a county taxpayer was denied standing
to challenge the legality of a resale of property upon which the county
had foreclosed for delinquent taxes. The reason given was that one who
had no interest in the land was not a real party in interest. The strength
of the decision as authority for the proposition that a taxpayer who has
suffered no personal injury is not entitled to a judicial inquiry into the
validity of such sales is weakened, however, by the court's express
notation that fraud had not been established as well as its approval of
taxpayers' suits to prevent illegal disposition of municipal moneys.
Cases involving removal of county seats from one city to another
present an interesting play on the presumed or fictional harm arising
from expenditure of funds for purposes deemed illegal. An early de-
cision,' noting that a person could have no private interest in the
location of a county seat, characterized such a question as political and
consigned it to the legislature for decision. It was soon distinguished
in another decision. 2 in which it was alleged that the removal would
involve an unnecessary expenditure of public funds. The distinction
was made by way of dictum, since the court based the plaintiff's stand-
ing on his office of county treasurer, but was reiterated in a subsequent
decision.' Still later it was stated'" that such actions by citizen tax-
payers lie only to prevent fraud or arbitrary action, not to control dis-
cretionary decisions, and that the answer to the question of striking
from an election petition the signatures of persons who later signed a
different petition involved an exercise of non-judicial discretion.
A somewhat similar immunity from taxpayer review is found in the
rule that if a city has the power to order an improvement, the deter-
mination that it is in the public interest to do so is not a reviewable
question.' However, where a dispute arose between the city council
and the comptroller as to the sufficiency of signatures to a petition, the
court found standing to raise the question in a voter who had signed
the petition.' While denying any intention of allowing disgruntled
taxpayers to harass the orderly process of government by an in-
100 196 Wash. 242, 250, 82 P.2d 236, 540 (1938).
10 Parmeter v. Bourne, 8 Wash. 45, 35 Pac. 586 (1894).
202 Rickey v. Williams, 8 Wash. 479, 36 Pac. 480 (1894).
103 Krieschel v. County Comm'rs, 12 Wash. 428, 41 Pac. 186 (1895).
204 Mann v. Wright, 81 Wash. 358, 142 Pac. 697 (1914).
105 In re Yesler Way, 94 Wash. 427, 430, 162 Pac. 536, 537 (1917).
106 State ex rel. Mohr v. City of Seattle, 59 Wash. 68, 109 Pac. 309 (1910).
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sistence on a literal application of directory provisions of statutes, the
court recently approved an injunction against the levying of a tax on
the ground of failure of compliance with such provisions." 7 It did so
over a vigorous dissenting argument that taxpayers had no justiciable
interest in the district's final budget and that the decision to tax or
not to tax is administrative in nature and not subject to judicial con-
trol. While the court has approved the issuance of a writ of mandamus
to compel the county prosecutor to institute quo warranto proceedings
against a city attorney who, contrary to statutory requirements, was
not a resident of the city,' it has denied standing to taxpayers who
have attempted direct attacks upon the rights of particular persons to
public offices. °'
In a miscellany of other situations, limitations upon the standing of
taxpayers in suits against counties and municipal corporations have
been shown. Thus it has been held that a taxpayer may not maintain
an action against city officials to recover funds which they have im-
properly disbursed unless the Attorney General has refused to act."0
Whether such an action could be maintained after the Attorney Gen-
eral refused was not decided. A citizen taxpayer who is not an appli-
cant for employment is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel
appointments to vacancies in the classified civil service of a city."'
Nor for lack of personal interest is a taxpayer who is qualified as a
court reporter entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel each of the
judges of a superior court to appoint an official reporter for his de-
partment." 2 While a taxpayer may enjoin the illegal awarding of a
contract to a higher bidder, it may not compel the award to itself, even
though the lowest bidder."' Nor may taxpayers obtain judicial review
of whether proposed action will constitute illegal preferences or dis-
crimination between various classes of municipal creditors."' Similarly,
it has been held that a taxpayer may not complain about the rates
established for garbage collection services between a municipal depart-
107 Allen v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 154 Wash. Dec. 222, 347 P.2d 539 (1959).
108 State ex rel. Brown v. Warnock, 12 Wn.2d 478, 122 P.2d 472 (1942).
109 State ex rel. Chapman v. Superior Court, 15 Wn.2d 637, 131 P.2d 958 (1942);
Manlove v. Johnson, 198 Wash. 280, 88 P.2d 397 (1939).
110 Jones v. City of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 289 Pac. 3 (1930).
M11 State ex reL Lay v. Simpson, 173 Wash. 512, 23 P.2d 886 (1933).
112 State ex rel. Taylor v. Lawler, 2 Wn.2d 488, 98 P.2d 658 (1940).
"a Bellingham Am. Publishing Co. v. Bellingham Publishing Co., 145 Wash. 25, 28,
258 Pac. 836, 837 (1927) ; Times Publishing Co. v. City of Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 521,
37 Pac. 695, 696 (1894).
" Weisfield v. City of Seattle, 180 Wash. 288, 40 P.2d 149 (1935) ; Von Herberg v.
City of Seattle, 157 Wash. 141, 288 Pac. 646 (1930).
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ment and other parties,'15 or make objections based on impairment of
another party's contract with the city," 6 although either of these might
lead to financial consequences as burdensome to individual taxpayers
as the harm presumed to result from illegal expenditures.
To summarize these cases is a difficult and dreary task. It is appar-
ent, however, that in this area the courts have abandoned their insist-
ence upon personal interest as an element of a justiciable controversy.
Only the fiction of presumed harm from illegal expenditures serves as
a disguise. The selection of this fiction as the guide principle for an
excursion into supervision of municipal corporations and counties has
produced an erratic supervision, energized only by the incantation of
illegal expenditures rather than by an intelligent appraisal of the role
of the judiciary in municipal and county government.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF LOCAL BOND ISSUES
In 1939 a statute was enacted to provide for judicial tests of the
validity of proposed bond issues of any county, city, school district,
or other municipal corporation or taxing district."' Pursuant to its pro-
visions, a complaint may be filed naming all taxpayers of the district
as defendants. The court thereupon appoints representative taxpay-
ers, whose attorneys are allowed a reasonable fee taxable against the
plaintiff, to defend the action. The remedy is expressly stated to be
in addition to other existing remedies.
A legislative invitation to participate in local affairs, such as that
provided in the 1939 statute, does much to obviate concern for the
anti-democratic aspects of judicial review. However, concern for limi-
tation of the activities of the judiciary to its proper role has led to
rejection of other invitations to participate in the activities of other
branches of government." 8 Availability of the procedures established
certainly enables bond counsel to render reliable opinions, but too free
a use of the statute may involve the judiciary in planning operations
better left to others. Whether the issues which may be raised in such
a proceeding are limited to those which a taxpayer might raise against
the levy and assessment of taxes apparently has not been decided.
Understandably, the question of standing has not occupied the atten-
tion of the court or litigants proceeding under the act.
1"5 Smith v. City of Spokane, 55 Wash. 219, 104 Pac. 249 (1909).
116 Moore v. City of Walla Walla, 60 Fed. 961 (Cir. Ct. Wash., 1894).
1i RCW 7.25.010-040.
118 Cf. Household Fin. Co. v. State, 40 Wn.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952).
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UNIFOnm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
In 1935 the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was adopted in
Washington." Section 1 of the act provides that courts of record:
[S]hall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. An action or pro-
ceeding shall not be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory
judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either af-
firmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.'20
Section 2 of the act provides that:
A person... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected
by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have de-
termined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a dec-
laration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.I 2
Section 11 of the act requires that a municipality be made a party
to any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance,
and further requires that the Attorney General be served and heard
in any proceeding in which it is alleged that a statute, ordinance or
franchise is unconstitutional. 2
These words give little direct assistance in determining when a per-
son has standing to obtain review of governmental action. In the words
of the statute, he must be one "whose rights, status, or other legal rela-
tions" are affected. In the opinion of commentators, the act provides
new procedures for declaring rights, status, or other legal relations in
circumstances different from those essential to the creation of a cause
of action, but it has not excused the plaintiff from the requirement of
showing a legal interest in the subject matter of the proceeding. 2' In
this respect the suggestion in the .recent decision in State ex rel Tatter-
sall v. Yelle' that the Declaratory Judgments Act itself confers stand-
ing upon state taxpayers which they would not otherwise have had is
novel and without support. The act is procedural and does not create
new substantive legal interests.
I'D Wash. Sess. Laws 1935, c. 113, as amended by Wash. Sess. Laws 1937, c. 14.
RCW 7.24.010-180.
220 RCW 7.24.010.
121 RCW 7.24.020.
122 RCW 7.24.110. Failure to serve the Attorney General creates a jurisdictional
defect. Parr v. City of Seattle, 197 Wash. 53, 84 P.2d 375 (1938).
123 1 ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, §§ 159, 162 (1951) ; BoRcHARD, DECLAR-
ATORY JUDGMENTS 48-56 (2nd ed., 1941).
124 52 Wn.2d 856, 329 P.2d 841 (1958), discussed in text accompanying note 61 supra.
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On the other hand, recognition of municipal taxpayer standing in
suits under the Declaratory Judgments Act' appears to be in conflict
with the unsound and criticized statements that the Uniform Declara-
tary Judgments Act has been limited in this state to cases where there
is no satisfactory remedy at law available." 6 Here it provides a new
and cumulative remedy in situations in which municipal taxpayer suits,
while technically a resort to equity, provide an adequate and satisfac-
tory remedy. In this connection, consideration might be given to the
previously stated view that the remedies of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act and the State Administrative Procedures Act are cu-
mulative and not mutually exclusive.'27 This is not to say that the
availability of other remedies is irrelevant in determining the scope of
the Uniform Act, because, as will be seen, inadequacy of other reme-
dies appears to influence the granting of standing.
The Declaratory Judgments Act received a test of its constitution-
ality in Washington within two years of its enactment in Acme Fin.
Co. v. Huse,' a proceeding challenging the validity of a small loan
act which had not yet become effective. The case is of importance not
only for its holding that the Declaratory Judgments Act is constitu-
tional, but for its statement of the standing requirements for a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a statute. On this latter subject the
court said:
[A] proper case for such relief is presented when a plaintiff alleges
(1) that he will be directly damaged in person or property by enforce-
ment of a statute; (2) that the defendant is charged with the duty of
enforcing the statute; and (3) is enforcing it or is about to do so; and
claims, upon these allegations, that such enforcement will result in the
infringement of his (the plaintiff's) constitutional rights. 129
The Acme Finance Company satisfied these requirements with its
allegations that it was engaged in the small loan business and that the
provisions of a regulatory statute, which would become enforcable by
criminal sanctions, were unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.
Standing to challenge a statute which had not yet become effective
125E.g. Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 328 P.2d 873 (1958);
Miller v. City of Pasco, 50 Wn.2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957).
126 Hawk v. Mayer, 36 Wn.2d 858, 866, 220 P.2d 885, 889 (1950) ; Peoples Park &
Amusement Ass'n v. Anrooney, 200 Wash. 51, 93 P.2d 362 (1939), noted unfavorably
15 WASH. L. REV. 56 (1940). 1 ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 195, at 393
(1951). Cf. Mulhausen v. Bates, 9 Wn.2d 264, 114 P.2d 995 (1941). But cf. BORCHARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 342-346 (2nd ed. 1941).
127 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
128 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341 (1937).
129 Id. at 107, 73 P.2d at 351.
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was recognized again in Berndson v. Graystone Materials Co., 80 in-
volving amendments to an existing unemployment compensation stat-
ute. Perhaps of more general importance has been the recognition,
displayed in the Acme case, that one engaged in an occupation or busi-
ness and subjected to control or regulation has standing to challenge
the statute imposing the control or regulation of his activities.' How-
ever, the control or regulation must be of activities in which he is
engaged and not merely of interest to those in the trade or profession.
Thus, while the requirements for a beauty operator's license are obvi-
ously of interest to the operator of a school of beauty culture, the
operator of such a school does not have standing to challenge those
licensing requirements absent a showing of abridgment of contract
rights with presently enrolled students.' While a licensed barber may
obtain a ruling on a statutory requirement that his photograph be
posted near his barber chair, he may not obtain review of require-
ments established for the licensing of other barbers. 8 Failure to un-
derstand that the strategy of strikes and picketing does not permit
application to a court for advance determination of its legality, sub-
ject to delays pending appeal, probably led to the failure to grant a
labor union and its president an advance determination of the validity
of an ordinance regulating picketing.'84
While standing in an alien whose property was subject to forfeiture
under an alien land law was recognized, the same decision denied
standing to a non-profit corporation with alien stockholders which had
no specific plans to purchase land and had not entered into any con-
tracts to do so."' A city employee was entitled to a declaratory judg-
ment determining the validity of a pension ordinance applicable to his
current employment upon the refusal of the city controller to perform
the duties prescribed by that ordinance.'86 Another case.'8 involved a
test of a 1951 statute requiring candidates for public office to file oaths
that they were not subversives. Some doubt might have existed as to
whether the four plaintiffs had sufficient personal interest in light of
180 34 Wn.2d 530, 209 P.2d 326 (1949).
18 ' Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wn.2d 281, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955); Bauer v. State, 7
Wn.2d 476, 110 P.2d 154 (1941); McDermott v. State, 197 Wash. 79, 84 P.2d 372(1938).
182 Washington Beauty College, Inc. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 80 P.2d 403 (1938).
18 McDermott v. State, 197 Wash. 79, 84 P.2d 372 (1938).
134 Adams v. City of Walla Walla, 196 Wash. 268, 82 P.2d 584 (1938).
135 DeCano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 110 P.2d 627 (1941). However, one of the cor-
porate purposes was to acquire land for a clubhouse, and the corporation desired to buy
and build upon real estate in Seattle. Brief of Appellant, p. 10.
236 Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wn.2d 545, 549-550, 108 P.2d 348 (1940).
13 Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wn.2d 767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952).
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the fact that they had not yet become candidates and required nomi-
nation at a party convention to achieve that status. But the public
interest in obtaining a judicial determination of this question as well
as the impracticality of waiting until their interests became more defi-
nite led the court to assert its jurisdiction.
Determinations of the plaintiff's status or the coverage of a regula-
tory statute have been made with approval in suits under the act,138
but the court refused to pass upon whether the union shop clause of
a collective bargaining agreement was contrary to public policy be-
cause the matter involved only a possible or potential dispute between
the parties.139
Where the plaintiff asserted no personal rights or legal interests in
the subject matter, but instead sought to vindicate the public interest
in a matter in which he had no greater concern than the public gen-
erally, the court has quite consistently denied standing. Thus, as pre-
viously mentioned, a taxpayer's interest in obtaining a proper location
of a county-city health center was not sufficient to confer standing
upon him. 4 ' A justice of the peace whose current term would not be
thereby shortened could not attack the validity of a statute establish-
ing municipal courts.'' Inferior governmental divisions and offices are
subject to the paramount power of the legislature and, therefore, as
units or offices, do not have the personal legal interest which will con-
fer standing to challenge legislative action unless a specific constitu-
tional provision respecting that unit or office is shown to forbid such
action.' Likewise, a taxpayer's generalized interest in whether a stat-
ute authorizing the creation of port districts is constitutional is not
sufficient to confer standing upon him to obtain such a determina-
tion.'4" Nor does a taxpayer's interest, shared with others in the dis-
trict, in who occupies certain offices entitle him to 'a judgment declaring
the rights of incumbency.'44 The interest of a barber already licensed
in the conditions upon which barbers from other states are admitted
138 Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wn.2d 498, 104 P.2d 478 (1940) ; Inland Empire
Rural Electrification, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Serv., 199 Wash. 527, 92 P.2d 258(1939) ; Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P.2d 718
(1939). But cf. Mulhausen v. Bates, 9 Wn.2d 264, 114 P.2d 995 (1941).
139 Brehm v. Retail Food & Drug Clerks Union, 4 Wn.2d 98, 102 P.2d 685 (1940).
140 Ia re City of Bellingham, 52 Wn.2d 497, 326 P.2d 471 (1958).
141 DeGrief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 1, 297 P.2d 940 (1956).
142 Kitsap County v. City of Bremerton, 46 Wn.2d 362, 281 P.2d 841 (1955). Cf.
DeGrief v. City of Seattle, supra note 141. But cf. Spokane County ex rel. Sullivan v.
Glover, 2 Wn.2d 162, 97 P.2d 628 (1940) ; Heisey v. Port of Tacoma, 4 Wn.2d 76, 102
P.2d 258 (1940).
143 Heisey v. Port of Tacoma, supra note 142.
144 Manlove v. Johnson, 198 Wash. 280, 88 P.2d 397 (1939).
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to practice in this state was not considered sufficiently direct and sub-
stantial--or, in other words, sufficiently different from those of the
public in general to permit him to challenge their constitutionality, 45
even though it appears from another case that he employed a substan-
tial number of barbers in his shop. 4 On the other hand, two recent
declaratory judgment proceedings have given consideration on the
merits to matters in which the plaintiff's legal interests were no dif-
ferent from those of the public at large."'
Denial of standing to one whose interests in the subject matter is
not different from that of the public in general is to a certain extent
inconsistent with the granting of standing because of public interest
in the matter, as was done in the previously mentioned case involving
the requirement of non-subversive oaths by candidates for office.'"
However, public interest in the matter has even led to pronouncement
of a declaratory judgment on a tax matter which had become moot
because of the failure of the taxpayer to make a sufficient protest upon
payment."9 In this respect a curious view of what constitutes a mat-
ter of public interest may be found in a mandamus proceeding in which
it was said that which of two candidates was entitled to elective office
was not in a legal sense a question of great public interest.5 ' Indeed,
the contrary of the proposition that public interest confers standing
might well be sustained. If the matter is of broad general interest, it
may well be one which should be settled in a political forum, rather
than in a court room with arguments controlled by a single party. It
is the cases which lack broad interest and exposure to public scrutiny
in which the judicial attributes of objectivity and impartiality serve
with maximum benefit.
As previously mentioned, the adequacy of other means of determin-
ing the commands of the law is a factor in determining whether a per-
son has, without taking further action, put himself into a position of
standing. Thus one may have standing if his only other means of ob-
taining a determination would require exposure to criminal prosecu-
tion. '5 Exposure to the risk of license revocation may also excuse one
145 McDermott v. State, 197 Wash. 79, 84 P.2d 372 (1938).
-46 McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P.2d 568 (1938).
"47 Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 328 P.2d 873 (1958) ; Miller v.
City of Pasco, 50 Wn.2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957).
14s Huntamer v. Coe, supra note 137.
'49 State ex rel. Yakima Amusement Co. v. Yakima County, 192 Wash. 179, 73 P.2d
759 (1937).
150 State ex rel. Chapman v. Superior Court, 15 Wn2d 637, 643, 131 P2d 958, 961
(1942).
15' Cf. Bauer v. State, 7 Wn.2d 476, 110 P2d 154 (1941) ; Acme Fin. Co. v. Huse,
192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341 (1937).
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from further action to establish standing.15" Likewise, the impracti-
cality of waiting until nominations had been made entitled prospective
candidates for public office to a determination of the constitutionality
of a statute requiring the filing of non-subversive oaths. 53 In the same
way that actions necessary to reduce a pocket watch to possession
may differ from the actions necessary to reduce a stockpile of lumber
to possession, what constitutes standing for one purpose may differ
from what constitutes standing for another, depending upon what is
practicable in the circumstances.
In a final appraisal of the results of litigation under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act, it would appear that the court required
a showing of a substantial, direct, personal and legal interest in the
subject matter as a basis for obtaining a determination on the merits.
Only in one area, that of taxpayers' suits, has the court shown the
leniency characteristic of its treatment of taxpayer suits generally.
The contrast between the two types of suits is so striking that it sug-
gests the probability of error in the role assigned the judiciary by one
or the other of the two lines of cases. In the meantime, for the prac-
titioner there remains the haunting possibility that, for example, while
a significant interest in the barber trade or beauty culture both as a
matter of profession and as an employer may not be sufficient to es-
tablish standing to challenge licensing requirements, an imaginative
search for the expenditure of funds in an "illegal" manner in admin-
istration of examinations and licensing procedures may produce that
fictional injury which confers status.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ACTION
The concept of private attorneys general who litigate in vindication
of the public interest"4 appears to have been accepted by the legisla-
ture in its selection of provisions governing judicial review of orders
of the Public Service Commission. It is provided that:
Any complainant or any public service company affected by any find-
ings or order of the commission, and deeming them contrary to law,
may... apply to the superior court of Thurston county for a writ of
review, for the purpose of having the reasonableness and lawfulness
of the findings or order inquired into and determined. 55
152 Cf. Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wn.2d 281, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955); McDermott v.
State, 197 Wash. 79, 84 P.2d 372 (1938).
153 Huntamer v. Coe, supra note 137.
154 See Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2nd Cir. 1943), dismissed as
moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.05 (1958).
155 RCW 80.04.170. The entire section would appear to have been superseded in part
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Conceivably a complainant might not be deemed to be "affected"
within the meaning of the statute by the dismissal of a complaint which
he filed, but this would appear unlikely. Thus, review ultimately is
available to any one of the class entitled to file complaints at the
agency level. That class is made broad enough to include everyone
by the statutory provision governing the filing of complaints, which
provides, in pertinent part, that:
Complaint may be made by the commission on its own motion, or by
any person, corporation, chamber of commerce, board of trade, or any
commercial, mercantile, agricultural, or manufacturing society, or any
body politic or municipal corporation, by complaint in writing, setting
forth any act or thing done or omitted by any public service company
claimed to be in violation of any provision of law or of any order or
rule of the commission.
... No complaint shall be dismissed because of the absence of direct
damage to the complainant.158
Of course, one interested in a particular proceeding might be limited
to participation in that proceeding as an intervenor if the commission,
exercising the discretion it has under the statute, refused to consoli-
date the interested party's separate complaint with that filed in the
proceeding in which he is interested. But even this limitation on achiev-
ing standing would probably be controlled by the so-called Ashbacker
doctrine, prohibiting the disposition of mutually exclusive cases in sep-
arate proceedings. 57 Thus, where one of three local telephone com-
panies sought to compel Pacific Telephone and Telegraph to make
inter-system connections, it was held error for the Department of Pub-
lic Works, predecessor of the Public Service Commission, to fail to
make one of the competing companies a party to the proceeding so as
to enable it to present its own evidence and cross examine witnesses.158
In another proceeding 59 in which the department granted one and
denied another application for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity, the unsuccessful applicant sought review, making the department
a party. The superior court, convinced that error had been committed,
reversed the department and ordered issuance of the certificate to the
by the 1959 State Administrative Procedures Act. See Trautman & Peck, The Adinin-
istrative Procedures Act, 34 WAsH. L. Rav. 281, at 289 (1959). However, as noted
above, that act's provisions regarding standing are not definitive and resort to the pat-
terns established by other statutes is necessary to answer standing questions.
156 RCW 80.04.110.157 See 1 DAvis, ADMINismRATiv LAW § 8.12 (1958).
158 State ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 144 Wash.
383, 258 Pac. 313 (1927).259 Sumner-Tacoma Stage Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 142 Wash. 594, 254
Pac. 245 (1927).
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unsuccessful applicant and denial of the successful applicant's appli-
cation. In a second review proceeding, the originally successful appli-
cant was held a necessary party to the first review proceeding. Noting
the relative silence of the statutes on the question of who should be
parties to proceedings reviewing the actions of the department, the
court concluded that the successful party at the administrative level
was a necessary party. It specifically rejected the argument that the
department represented the successful applicant in the first proceed-
ing, stating that it represented only the public interest. The first re-
view proceeding was not binding upon the successful applicant and
could take away no right that had been given it. From this and the
preceding case, and with the aid of imagination, an argument can be
constructed by which any complainant would be entitled to have the
hearing of his complaint consolidated with a related hearing if action
inconsistent with that which he requested would ensue, and, having
established his position as a party to the proceeding, he could then
obtain review.
On the other hand, an earlier decision.. harbors contrary indications.
The long-term contract which an industrial consumer enjoyed with a
water company was found to be discriminatory by the commission in
a proceeding to which the consumer was not a party. In an action
brought by the consumer to restrain the water company from refus-
ing to furnish water at the contract price, the validity of the order
was sustained. The court specifically stated that there was no require-
ment that the commission give notice to parties to contracts setting
other rates as a condition precedent to its taking action.' If a con-
sumer with such a contract is not entitled to notice, his right to par-
ticipate in the proceeding appears tenuous and his right to seek review
even more so.
Subsequent litigation has produced holdings that competing bus lines
may complain that another is operating in violation of the terms of its
certificate of convenience and necessity, 2 and that a competing ferry
line may protest the proposed termination of service to intermediate
stops which would make its rival a more effective competitor.'63 Status
160 Raymond Lumber Co. v. Raymond Light & Water Co., 92 Wash. 330, 159 Pac.
133 (1916).
161 Id. at 342-343, 159 Pac. at 138.
162 State ex rel. North Bend Stage Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 26 Wn.2d
485, 174 P.2d 516 (1946).
163 State ex rel. Puget Sound Nay. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Works, 161 Wash. 622, 297
Pac. 795 (1931).
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as a complainant in such proceedings would, under the statutory lan-
guage, entitle those initiating parties to review.
Admittedly, these cases do little to clarify the question of the stand-
ing requirements for review of action of the public service commission.
A literal reading of the statute indicates that such review is available
to anyone who files a complaint. Litigation under a special statu-
tory provision suggests that when the legislature wanted to restrict
standing, it knew how to use appropriate language.1 6 4
MISCELLANEOUS INTERESTS AND PROCEEDINGS
At an early date, faced with a complete neglect on the part of city
officers to provide for an election upon the day established by law, the
Washington court held that a citizen and voter could compel the in-
cumbent mayor to canvass the returns of an election actually held on
that day.' From this developed a line of cases finding the right to
maintain an action questioning the eligibility of candidates for office
to be inherent in a citizen and elector.' A limitation upon the rule
was recently stated in a case holding that a justiciable issue is presented
relating to the eligibility of candidates prior to the filing of a declara-
tion of candidacy.' There is an inconsistency between these and the
previously discussed cases 68 denying taxpayers standing to make di-
rect challenges to the rights of incumbency of particular office holders,
explainable, perhaps by the possibility of quo warranto proceedings
instituted by the prosecuting attorney or a person claiming the office.
Conceivably the cases could be forced into the mold of suits to prevent
the wasting of public funds in an election of an officer who could not
legally serve, but the court has not articulated this thought.
With respect to initiative measures, statutory provision has been
made for citizens to challenge the Secretary of State's determination
of the sufficiency of the signatures attached to a petition. 6" This legis-
lative invitation to supervise the initiative process has received a gin-
gerly acceptance in cases treating such questions as political and not
judicial questions except insofar as there is express statutory or con-
164 City of Everett v. Department of Pub. Works, 125 Wash. 341, 215 Pac. 1045
(923). But cf. State ex rel. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Works,
143 Wash. 67, 254 Pac. 839 (197).
165 State ex rel. Harvey v. Mason, 45 Wash. 234, 88 Pac. 126 (1907).
166 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Howell, 70 Wash. 467, 126 Pac. 954 (1912) ; State ex
rel. Todd v. Reeves, 196 Wash. 145, 82 P.2d 173 (1938). Cf. State ex rel. Chandler v.
Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 Pac. 569 (1918) (passing on the merits of a candidate's
eligibility without discussion of standing).
167 State ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini, 155 Wash. Dec. 554, 348 P.2d 971 (1960).
168 See text accompanying note 44 mupra.
16) RCW 29.79210.
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stitutional law making the question judicial.' At an earlier date, how-
ever, at the request of taxpayers the court intervened in the initiative
process to the extent of enjoining the preparation of initiative petitions
upon the ground that the preamble to the initiative constituted an ar-
gumentative statement in favor of its adoption which should not be
printed at state expense.'
Recognition that fish in the waters and game in the forests in the
state belong to the people of the state led to a refusal to review a
game department decision to poison the fish of a lake, even though
the plaintiffs were littoral property owners whose interest therein, in
a practical sense at least, was greater than that of the public in gen-
eral. 2 To have ventured a judgment upon the wisdom of such action,
even at the request of persons so factually concerned, would have re-
sulted in an intrusion upon matters better handled by the legislative or
administrative branches of government. In another proceeding involv-
ing the then fish commissioner, the court refused to issue a writ of
mandamus defining his duties, saying that even if he desired such in-
struction, to give it would be contrary to the purposes for which courts
are organized and would involve the judiciary in general supervision
of all affairs of government.'
Finally, while mandamus will not issue to compel a general course of
official conduct, such as requiring a sheriff to enforce a variety of law
against an indefinite number of people,' 4 a person need not show any
legal or special interest in the result to compel the issuance of a war-
rant for arrest of a person if the evidence adduced convinces the supe-
rior court judge that it is a proper case in which to proceed with a
prosecution."' Private citizens may not, however, proceed directly to
enjoin acts of corporate defendants or require a general compliance
with the laws of the state in the absence of a showing of special interest
in the matter. 6
CONCLUSION
Most of the author's conclusions appear in the introductory obser-
vations stated in the first pages of this article, where, hopefully, they
170 Hanson v. Meyers, 54 Wn.2d 724, 344 P.2d 513 (1959) ; State ex rel. Donohue v.
Coe, 49 Wn.2d 410, 302 P.2d 202 (1956).
11 State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 16, 159 Pac. 92 (1916).
172 Judd v. Bernard, 49 Wn.2d 619, 304 P.2d 1046 (1956).
173 State ex rel. Am. Fisheries v. Darwin, 81 Wash. 1, 142 Pac. 441 (1914).
174 State ex rel. Hawes v. Brewer, 39 Wash. 65, 80 Pac. 1001 (1905).
175 State ex rel. Romand v. Yakey, 43 Wash. 15, 85 Pac. 990 (1906).
176 State ex rel. White v. Point Roberts Reef Fish Co., 42 Wash. 409, 85 Pac. 22
(1906). But cf. Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932) in which licensed
lawyers obtained an injunction against the illegal practice of law by a notary public.
0
[VoL 35
STANDING REQUIREMENTS
may come to the attention of readers unfatigued by detail inserted to,
assist attorneys concerned with particular problems of standing. A few
additional observations may be made, however, at this point.
The questions involved in determining the standing required to ob-
tain review of governmental action in Washington are by no means
finally resolved. Within recent years a change in the rule concerning
the standing of state taxpayers was accomplished without full appre-
ciation of prior precedents and through a misinterpretation of the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act. That change, as well as the extent
of the rule granting standing to municipal and local taxpayers, has
been under attack by a minority, frequently consisting of four of the
nine judges of the supreme court and led by Judge Mallery. 7  Fur-
ther developments may be expected. It is to be hoped that when they
do occur it will be upon the basis of an evaluation of the role of the
judiciary in the process of government, rather than a search for a deci-
sion upon sufficiently similar facts or by manufacture of technical dis-
tinctions without any relevance to the functioning of government. Re-
spect for the principles of democratic representative government, con-
cern with the relative competence of the judiciary to formulate policy
under the limitations existing on acquisition of information, and doubts
about its ability to provide dynamic leadership when action by others
is necessary to activate its processes all lead to the conclusion that only
in the very unusual circumstances should courts grant standing to a
private person whose interest in the subject matter to be litigated is
no different from that of the public in general or to one whose injury
is fictional and not real. On the other hand, standing may properly
be recognized in a public officer charged by the structure of govern-
ment with responsibility for litigating in the public interest with other
officers or departments. Likewise, the private person who claims that
his rights or his particular and personal interests are improperly af-
fected by action of the majority or the majority's representatives has
stated a proper and traditional case for judicial intervention.
177 Warburton v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 155 Wash. Dec. 820, 350 P.2d 161
(1960); Allen v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 155 Wash. Dec. 222 347 P.2d 539 (1959);
State ex rel. Tattersall v. Yelle, 52 Wn.2d 856, 329 P.2d 841 (1958) ; Winkenwerder
v. City of Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 328 P.2d 873 (1958) ; Miller v. City of Pasco, 50
Wn.2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957). See also DeGrief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 1, 297
P.2d 940 (1956), where the court apparently raised the question on its own motion.
But cf. State ea rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini, 155 Wash. Dec. 554, 348 P.2d 971 (1960), where
the standing of the parties challenging the Governor's item veto of his salary increase
was not discussed.
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